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Summary 
Concern surrounding employment issues such as job creation, job security 
and job quality has led to these issues being included in the collective 
bargaining process in Spain. Nevertheless, there are a number of matters 
which should receive greater attention from the social partners in future. Of 
particular importance is the need to co-ordinate collective bargaining in order 
to make it more flexible, i.e. more adaptable, whilst at the same time providing 
a stable framework in order to avoid the problems associated with the 
fragmentation of employment conditions. This article looks at the evolution of 
collective bargaining on employment issues since the end of the 1970s, as 
well as the social partners' main bargaining demands with regard to these 
issues, and their most prominent characteristics. 
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The first steps towards collective bargaining on employment issues 
[LEVEL 1] 
 
Employment issues began to be included in the collective bargaining process 
in Spain at the end of the 1970s. The severe economic crisis which the 
country was going through at the time led to major restructuring within 
companies, and that in turn led to industrial disputes, but also to negotiations. 
This was a time of very high unemployment, and as a result, for several years 
unemployment became the most important issue for Spanish society. Against 
this background, there was an intense period of negotiations between 
employers and trade unions from 1979 to 1985#1#, which resulted in the 
signing of various centrally -agreed social pacts in which employment played 
a key role, either in terms of promoting job creation or in terms of assistance 
for the unemployed. Not all the promises made during these negotiations 
were kept, however, especially with regard to job creation. The result was 
widespread disenchantment and the eventual decision of the trade unions to 
pull out of the negotiations altogether. This marked the beginning of a new 
phase in Spanish industrial relations characterised by frequent disputes and 
deep mistrust between the social partners, culminating in the dramatic general 
strike of 14 December 1988, which was in part sparked off by discontent with 
regard to employment issues.  
 
During the economic crisis of the early 1990s, the problem of employment 
returned, as did concern about employment issues. The trade unions entered 
into either bipartite or tripartite negotiations at different levels, from local level 
to national level. Between 1992 and 1993, agreements to promote 
employment were signed in nearly all of Spain's autonomous regions, 
although in practice their impact tended to be limited. A small number of 
agreements were also signed at local authority level aimed at attracting 
companies to the area in question. 
 
Shortly afterwards, in 1994, the government introduced a labour law reform 
which was to have far-reaching effects on future negotiations on employment 
issues (del Rey 1998). There are four aspects of this reform which are of 
interest in our context (Alós et al. 1994): 
 
• it reduced the role and scope of legislation, 
• it gave an increased legal role to collective bargaining and individual 
negotiations too, 
• it made collective bargaining more flexible by recognising company-level 
’pacts’#2#, and 
• it gave employers greater scope to determine employment conditions. 
 
As a result of this reform, many workers found themselves facing the problem 
of how to respond to decisions regarding employment issues that companies 
were now able to take thanks to the greater legal room for manoeuvre at their 
disposal. For the trade unions, one way of responding was via negotiation, 
and consequently they sought to restrict employers' room for manoeuvre in 
collective agreements and company-level ‘pacts’ on issues such as temporary 
jobs, which, as is widely known, account for over 30% of the average Spanish 
company's workforce. One problem with this approach, however, is that by 
reaching this type of agreement, the workers' representatives were effectively 
legitimising employers’ use of temporary contracts (Escudero 1997). This type 
of negotiations, which had not been seen before, led to a split between the 
leadership of the main trade union confederations on the one hand, and 
elected workers representatives and trade union representatives at company 
level on the other. Whilst the former were opposed to the unjustified use of 
temporary contracts, the latter were more concerned with improving the terms 
of employment of temporary workers, thereby implying that they accepted this 
type of contract as legitimate (Falguera and López Bulla 1997). It should in 
any case be pointed out that such agreements have been reached in only a 
few companies, mainly ones with a unionised workforce where employers 
have more difficulties in imposing their authority.. 
 
Collective bargaining on employment issues after the Interconfederal 
Agreement for Employment Stability (AIEE) [LEVEL 1] 
The period of economic growth experienced during the second half of the 
1990s brought about a significant change in the issues that were of greatest 
concern to Spanish citizens, with job instability due to temporary contracts 
joining unemployment at the top of the agenda. Indeed, some employers were 
even to be heard complaining that the extremely high level of job instability 
was affecting the stability of consumer behaviour and causing economic 
uncertainty. 
 
Against this new background, and under the auspices of a conservative 
government (the Popular Party) under pressure to obtain social 
acceptance#3#, employers and trade unions entered into negotiations which 
culminated in the signing of three major agreements in April 1997. One of 
these agreements, known as the ‘Interconfederal Agreement for Stability in 
Employment’ (AIEE), was designed to achieve a reduction in the level of 
temporary contracts through the introduction of a new type of permanent 
contract which reduces the amount of redundancy money that employers 
have to pay in cases of wrongful dismissal#4#. It has also been agreed with 
the government that companies converting temporary contracts into 
permanent ones will receive a rebate in employer's social security 
contributions provided that the conversion of the contracts is handled via 
collective bargaining. 
 
It can thus be said that the AIEE has done a lot to promote the negotiation of 
employment issues, both in sectoral collective agreements and in plant-level 
’pacts’. Furthermore, the AIEE has come to be regarded as a reference point 
for negotiations at autonomous region level or below. This process of 
decentralised negotiations between employers and trade unions has been 
encouraged still further by the recent EU employment guidelines. 
 
One characteristic shared by the majority of the agreements on employment 
issues that have been negotiated since 1997 is the tendency to offer more 
stable employment terms in exchange for flexibility in working hours and tasks 
performed at work (Martín Artiles et al. 2000). This trade-off has formed the 
basis of a wide range of agreements. What ‘more stable employment terms’ 
has meant is employers committing to limit their use of temporary workers or 
only to use them in certain circumstances or for certain types of job, as well as 
providing assurances regarding the extent to which they will use temporary 
employment agencies, and also stabilising employment terms by converting 
temporary contracts into permanent ones. All of these promises are intended 
to increase the security of employees. As far as the employee side is 
concerned, they have accepted a greater degree of multi-tasking and more 
flexibility as regards working hours. Multi-skilling has been promoted so that 
workers can perform a number of different tasks, and new job classifications 
have also been introduced with a reduced number of professional categories 
and a high level of mobility within categories. 
 
As far as flexibility of working hours is concerned, it is necessary to distinguish 
between atypical working hours and flexitime. Atypical working hours refers to 
the introduction of new shifts, working at weekends and other types of 
unconventional work patterns. Flexitime, on the other hand, refers to the 
ability to vary the number of hours worked per day or per week, as long as the 
total number of hours worked per year remains the same. In other words, an 
annual hours total is established, and employers can decide, freely or with 
certain restrictions, how these hours are divided up in order to best meet 
production requirements, for example by increasing the number of hours 
worked on certain days or by calling people in to work on Saturdays or public 
holidays. In some cases, the decision to apply flexitime is taken exclusively by 
management on the basis of the prevailing set of circumstances, whereas in 
others workers' representatives are involved. Their participation may be 
restricted to information and consultation, or it may also be that their explicit 
agreement is required. Workers on flexitime usually receive advance warning 
of changes to their working hours, although the notice they receive is almost 
always small or minimal. There are also a limited number of examples of 
workers being compensated for having to work unconventional hours, and a 
maximum number of hours that can be worked per day is also established in 
some cases (CC.OO. 2000, CEOE 2001, UGT 2001). 
 
Other employment-related issues, such as vocational training, have received 
some attention in collective bargaining rounds. However, despite its being one 
of the trade unions' top priorities, there have been hardly any agreements on 
the reduction of working hours. Subcontracting and people working from 
home are two further issues of acknowledged importance which have not yet 
received the attention they deserve in collective negotiations, as 
demonstrated by the fact that few agreements have been reached that take 
them into account#5#. 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the social partners'’ main employment-related 
demands that are currently covered by collective bargaining. 
 
Table 1. Main employment-related demands covered by collective 
bargaining 
Trade union demands: 
Maintaining employment levels/job creation 
More stable contracts 
Restrictions on use of flexible contract types 
Restrictions on subcontracting 
Restrictions on flexitime 
Guarantees regarding multitasking 
Training 
            To be regarded as legitimate partners and to be involved 
Employer demands: 
Reduction of labour costs 
More flexible working hours 
More flexible work practices 
Retraining of workers 
Motivation as a means of control 
Corporate image 
Acceptance of change 
Government demands: 
Keep wages in check 
Job creation and reduction of unemployment 
Training and retraining 
Prevention of social conflict 
Social recognition 
 
Evaluation [LEVEL 1] 
 
It is fair to say that employment has not only become one of the issues that 
are usually included in collective negotiations, but that in some cases it has 
even been elevated to the status of a key element of such negotiations. This 
has been interpreted as meaning that collective bargaining has been 
enriched, not only because it covers a wider range of issues, but also in 
qualitative terms. It is true that collective bargaining on employment issues 
can encourage negotiations that are not restricted to pay, opening the door to 
greater influence on matters such as job security, job quality, helping people 
into work, working hours, vocational training, retraining, etc. However, it 
should be remembered that although the prospects in this respect are 
important, they nevertheless remain limited. 
 
In the 1990s, productivity was replaced by competitiveness in the language 
used by employers, and this terminology has been introduced into collective 
bargaining on employment issues. However, the implications of this go 
beyond a mere change in terminology. Whilst productivity is something which 
is at least partly dependent on the decisions of the people who are directly 
involved in production, a company's competitiveness is not solely determined 
by what these people do. What this means is that by tying employment, 
working time, tasks to be performed or wages to a company's 
competitiveness, workers are made into the victims of the market's 
unpredictability, or even made to appear responsible for their own 
employment situation. 
 
One consequence of collective bargaining on employment issues is that it 
leads to a broadening of social dialogue in its different levels, resulting in a 
significant deepening of relations between the social partners. One visible 
outcome of this is the emergence of a climate of greater knowledge and trust 
among the social partners, something which could gel into a culture of 
dialogue, creating a promising basis for future negotiations with repercussions 
that could extend beyond purely employment-related matters. This does not 
mean the end of industrial disputes or clashes of interests between the social 
partners, but it does point to a greater readiness to resolve disputes by 
negotiation. 
 
One of the main characteristics of collective bargaining on employment issues 
is a lack of co-ordination, something which constitutes a widespread problem, 
although there are some indications of a trend towards greater internal co-
ordination by the various social partners, particularly in the case of the trade 
unions and to a lesser extent also on the part of employers' organisations. 
The same cannot be said of co-ordination between the different levels of 
government, which is virtually non-existent, although some measure of co-
ordination of actions has been provided by the European guidelines on 
employment policy or by major agreements between the state, employers and 
trade unions, such as the AIEE. Nevertheless, there has been virtually no co-
ordination between regional and local initiatives and the National Employment 
Action Plan (Aragón et al. 2000). There has been some very limited 
centralisation of collective agreements with a view to reducing their extremely 
fragmented nature (Consejo Económico y Social 2001). In a very few cases 
(for example in the chemical sector), sectoral collective agreements do 
include clauses that allow for company-level circumstances to be taken into 
account in the implementation of the agreement, and in these cases it is 
possible to talk of co-ordinated negotiation of collective agreements. The 
negotiation of company-level ‘pacts’ on employment issues is even less co-
ordinated and more fragmented, lacking any co-ordination mechanism at all 
except for whatever efforts may happen to be made by trade unions or 
employers' associations in specific areas. 
 
The inadequate co-ordination of collective bargaining and the prevalence of 
company-level ‘pacts’ on employment issues can result in fragmentation and 
segmentation. In other words, it can create or consolidate significant 
differences between the employment terms of different groups of workers, for 
example between permanent and temporary workers when a dual salary 
scale is introduced which is not temporary in nature; or between workers who 
work conventional hours and have considerable freedom to determine their 
working time and workers who are forced to be available for work at almost 
any time or to work atypical or irregular hours; or between the workers of 
companies where it is possible to negotiate more favourable employment 
terms and the workers of companies, small or otherwise, where this is more 
difficult or impossible. All of the above scenarios are possible outcomes of 
collective bargaining on employment issues, which serves to demonstrate its 
limitations if it is not co-ordinated and regulated at sectoral or national levels, 
and with labour legislation that guarantees employment standards for all 
companies and all workers. 
 
The signing of company-level ‘pacts’ on employment issues throughout the 
1990s appears largely to have been a response to the inflexibility of collective 
agreements which limit employers' ability to determine working hours and how 
work is organised. The incorporation of flexibility regarding working hours and 
tasks performed into collective agreements signed at the end of the 
nineties#6# seems to indicate greater reluctance to negotiate ‘pacts’ on 
employment issues at company level. 
 
In some cases there appears to be a conflict between the interests and 
expectations of individuals and the policies of their organisations. Examples of 
this internal conflict, which appears to be at its greatest in the case of workers, 
are the ‘controversial’ agreements with regard to dual salary scales or 
concerning the acceptance of procedures for automatic redundancies under 
specific business circumstances. These are conflicts between the trade union 
leadership and the company-level workers' representatives or shop stewards. 
There are also conflicts with particular groups of workers. For example, there 
are cases of trade unions or workers' representatives accepting agreements 
on flexible or atypical working hours, such as working Saturdays or on public 
holidays, which have sometimes met with opposition from the workers 
affected. 
 
Finally, by way of conclusion, when analysing current collective bargaining 
trends with regard to employment issues it is important not to forget the 
background of a prolonged period of economic growth during the second half 
of the 1990s, which has created favourable circumstances for job creation and 
better and more stable jobs. There can be no doubt that the economic 
situation has been conducive to the development of collective bargaining on 
employment issues, enabling the consolidation of a climate of trust and 
dialogue between the social partners. Nevertheless, this begs the question of 
how the social partners, and in particular employers, would respond to 
adverse economic conditions. It should not be forgotten that the current 
consensus in the field of industrial relations is extremely fragile. Similarly, it is 
important to remember that it takes a long time for a climate of trust to be built 
up and consolidated, whereas all it needs is for employers to take just one 
unilateral decision which has a major impact on workers' interests (e.g. 
redundancies) for all this trust-building to be seriously undermined. This 
problem, which derives from the economic situation at a given time, is the 
great risk which is always present in the development of industrial relations. 
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#1# These were also the years of the transition to democracy during which 
the foundations of the current Spanish industrial relations system were laid. 
#2# Nevertheless, company ‘pacts’ do not receive the same legal recognition 
as collective agreements. 
#3# The Popular Party won the 1996 elections, bringing to an end twelve 
years of socialist rule. 
#4# The majority of redundancies in Spain are a result of temporary contracts 
coming to an end. Workers with permanent contracts may be made redundant 
on economic, technological or organisational grounds, although this is not the 
most widely-used method of dismissal (it is virtually only found in medium-
sized and large companies). Workers may also be made redundant for 
disciplinary reasons. In this case, if the worker does not accept the reasons 
given, the matter is resolved by an industrial tribunal. If the tribunal finds in 
favour of the worker, the company may choose still to go ahead with the 
redundancy on payment of a sum which is usually equivalent to 45 days' pay 
for every year worked, but which has been reduced to 33 days' pay per year 
worked in the case of the new contracts created under the AIEE. Disciplinary 
reasons are very widely used as grounds for dismissal in Spain. 
#5# Possibly the most important agreement is the collective agreement for the 
textiles industry, in which employers and unions agreed (in April 2000) on a 
system for regulating ‘out-of-house’ work (i.e. people working from home), the 
use of temporary employment agencies, and subcontracting. The extent to 
which workers' representatives are kept informed about such activities and 
are able to monitor them has been increased significantly. Given the 
dispersed nature of the textiles sector, the collective agreement establishes 
that accredited trade union officials can act as workers' representatives within 
textiles companies with a view to monitoring employment trends and ensuring 
that the collective agreement is implemented  at all levels. 
#6# In the year 2000, for example, 45% of workers were covered by collective 
agreements which allowed working hours to be unevenly distributed over the 
course of the year, whereas this kind of clause was almost unheard-of just a 
few years previously (Economic and Social Council 2001: 400-401). 
